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BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This Court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to 
Section 78-2a-3(2)(a), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, 
in that this case involves an appeal from an order of the Industrial 
Commission of Utah. 
Applicant Bernice Steward filed a claim for dependent's 
benefits and burial benefits on February 19, 1986 seeking 
benefits as a result of the death of her husband, Dale Steward, 
who died during the course of his employment with Lanier Brugh, 
Inc. on or about November 11, 1985. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Applicant Bernice Steward accepts in general the Statement 
of Issues presented by Appellants. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
1. Section 35-1-45/ Utah Code Annotated 1953/ as amended. 
Compensation for Industrial Accidents 
2. Section 35-1-68/ Utah Code Annotated 1953/ as amended. 
Injury Causing Death 
3. Section 35-1-77/ Utah Code Annotated 1953/ as amended. 
Medical Panel 
4. Section 35-1-82.52, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. 
Hearing Before Examiner 
5. Section 35-1-82.54, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. 
Review of Order by Commission 
6. Section 35-1-83, Utah Code Annotated 1953/ as amended. 
Review by Court of Appeals 
7. Section 35-1-88/ Utah Code Annotated 1953/ as amended. 
Rules of Evidence and Procedure-Admissible Evidence 
8. Rule 201/ Utah Rules of Evidence 
Judicial Notice 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the case/ course of proceedings/ and disposition 
by the Industrial Commission. 
Applicant Bernice Steward adopts the Statement of the 
Nature of the Case of Appellants. 
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B. Statement of facts. 
Applicant Bernice Steward accepts for the most part the 
Statement of Facts of Appellants/ but asserts that it is incomplete 
and therefore makes her own Statement of Facts as follows: 
1. The decedent Dale W. Steward/ husband of Applicant 
Bernice Steward/ was employed by Lanier Brugh Corporation at 
the time of his death on November 12, 1985. Mr. Steward carried 
U.S. Mail during the course of his employment with Lanier Brugh. 
(R. 32, 232-233) 
2. Mr. Steward was scheduled by his employer to leave 
Salt Lake City at 11:00 P.M. on November 10, 1985 to drive to 
Denver, Colorado. (R. 26-27) 
3. The truck Mr. Steward was to drive was late arriving 
in Salt Lake City because of bad weather. Mr. Steward talked 
to the Lanier Brugh dispatcher several times during the night 
to determine if his truck was in. At approximately 1:00 o'clock 
A.M., he was instructed by the dispatcher to check back at 3:00 
o'clock A.M. (R. 27-28) While he had worked for Lanier Brugh, 
Mr. Steward's truck had never before arrived so late. (R. 33) 
4. Mr. Steward did not go to bed the night of November 
10-11 and got no sleep because he wanted to be ready when the 
truck arrived. (R. 28-29) 
5. Mr. Steward left the house to get his truck at 5:30 A.M. 
on November 11, 1985. (R.30) He arrived in Denver at approximately 
5:30 P.M. on November 11. (R. 48) The trip from Salt Lake 
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to Denver took approximately 12 hours when it normally took 
10 hours. (R. 48-49) 
6. Mr. Steward called Mrs. Steward from Denver at 6:20 P.M. 
on November 11 and reported that the roads between Salt Lake 
City and Denver had been bad and very icy. (R. 30, 49) He 
sounded very tired. (R. 31) 
7. Mr. Steward indicated he had to call his employer 
at 11:00 o'clock P.M. on November 11 to determine if his truck 
was ready for the normally scheduled return trip to Salt Lake 
City. (R. 31/ 60) He told Mrs. Steward he did not have enough 
time to sleep and was too wound up. (R. 31-32) 
8. Mr. Steward had never before had a short layover of 
five to six hours in Denver. The usual layover was twelve to 
fourteen hoars. (R. 59-60) 
9. It is estimated that Mr. Steward left Denver for the 
return trip to Salt Lake between approximately 11:00 P.M. and 
11:15 P.M. on November 11. (R. 86) 
10. The accident involving Mr. Steward occurred at approximate! 
11:30 P.M. according to the police report. (R. 99) 
11. Although the police report indicated that road conditions 
were dry (R. 99)/ a passerby who stopped to assist stated that 
the surface of 1-25 was wet with snow starting to stick to it 
(R. 102-103) His initial report shows a time of 11:45 P.M. 
(R. 102) 
12. The police photographs of the scene do not reflect 
the time at which they were taken. (R. 52, 191) The officer's 
report shows arrival at the accident scene at 11:44 P.M. (R. 99) 
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13. An eyewitness to the accident observed the truck 
move over two lanes to the left and hit the concrete median, 
lodging on top. (R. 105) The two witnesses found Mr. Steward 
upside down in the truck cab with his arms hanging over his 
head and his feet tangled. (R. 102, 104, 106-7) Mr. Steward's 
eyes were open, there was no pulse, and no CPR was administered. 
(R. 106-7) The police arrived shortly after this point. 
(R. 104) 
14. The emergency record from the Humana Hospital-Mountain 
View indicates Mr. Steward died at 12:08 A.M. on November 12, 
1985, of acute cardiac arrest. (R. 116) 
15. Mr. Steward's body was returned to Utah by Inman 
Nationwide Shipping. (R. 231) The mortician who prepared Mr. 
Steward's body for viewing at Walker Mortuary in Provo, Utah, 
stated his opinion that bruises and swelling on the right side 
of Mr. Steward's neck and face appeared to have resulted from 
a blow or impact. (R. 253) 
16. Lanier Brugh expended approximately $9,700.00 to 
repair damage to the truck driven by Mr. Steward. (R. 234-242) 
Along with other damage to the vehicle, the seat was damaged 
the steering wheel was bent, and the windshield was cracked. 
(R. 79) 
17. On October 11, 1985, Mr. Steward was examined by 
Dr. Gerald R. Moress, who changed Mr. Steward's prescription 
for Dexedrine from 10 milligrams to 15 milligrams. At the time 
of his examination, Dr. Moress noted blood pressure at 120/80 
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and no carotid bruits. (R. 133) Treatment with Dexedrine apparen 
commenced in September, 1980. (R. 129-130) Mr. Steward was 
apparently taking Dexedrine at the time of the accident. 
(R. 38) 
18. Mr. Steward was 56 years old at the time of his death 
and smoked \ \ packs of cigarettes per day. He had smoked for 
approxiately 36 years. (R. 55) Dr. Maurice Taylor had treated 
Mr. Steward for emphysema. (R. 125) 
19. Mr. Steward was approximately 5 feet 1\ inches tall 
and weighed approximately 180 pounds. (R. 42) 
20. Mr. Steward had no prior history of cardiac disease 
(R. 245) and had been told by Dr. Moress shortly before he 
died that he had the heart of a young man. (R. 42) 
21. According to Mrs. Steward/ Mr. Steward had taken 
Ritalin on only one occasion/ and had taken only one of the 
10 milligram Dexedrine tablets at a time. (R. 56-57) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I: The Utah Supreme Court has pointed out on a number 
of occasions that an appellate court's review of Findings of 
Fact made by the Industrial Commission is strictly limited and 
is not based on agreement with the Commission's findings or 
whether the findings are supported by a preponderance of the 
evidence. The reviewing court's sole inquiry is, 
whether the Commission's findings are 'arbitrary or 
capricious/1 or 'wholly without cause' or contrary to 
the 'one [inevitable] conclusion from the evidence' or 
without 'any substantial evidence' to support them. Only 
then should the Commission's findings be displaced. 
Kaiser Steel Corporation v. Monfredi/ 631 P.2d 888, 890 
(Utah 1981). 
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In this matter, the Administrative Law Judge/ affirmed by the 
Industrial Commission/ correctly found that Mr. Steward had 
no preexisting heart condition or other preexisting conditions/ 
allowing Mrs. Steward to establish legal causation by showing 
"any exertion connected with his employment." Allen v. Industrial 
Commission/ 729 P.2d 15/ 29 (Utah 1986). 
POINT II: Mrs. Steward established by uncontroverted evidence 
that Mr. Steward was under unusual stress and was extremely 
fatigued at the time of death. He had had a sleepless night 
on November 10-11/ had driven for 12 hours to Denver over icy 
roads/ and had had a short/ 5 to 6 hour layover with apparently 
no sleep before beginning his return to Salt Lake City. Legal 
causation was established even if the "unusual exertion" standard 
of Allen is applied. 
POINT III: Medical causation was established by evidence from 
Dr. Heilbrun tuing Mr. steward's death to stress and fatigue 
and by the causation factors for cardiac arrythmias referred 
to by Dr. Perry and of which the Administrative Law Judge properly 
took judicial notice pursuant to Rule 201/ Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Section 35-1-77, Utah Code Annotated 1953/ as amended/ provides 
that the Commission may refer the medical aspects of a case 
to a medical panel. The Commission's use of a medical panel 
is thus permissive. Given the facts surrounding Mr. Steward's 
death/ including his lack of sleep over the prior 26 hours/ 
the evidence of a causal relationship between the stress and 
fatigue and Mr. Steward's death was not uncertain or highly 
technical. 
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POINT IV: The Commission properly reviewed the entire record 
in this matter as provided in Section 35-1-82.54/ Utah Code 
Annotated 1953/ as amended. Even if a transcript of the testimony 
were not reviewed/ which has not been established/ the Commission 
had available the summary of testimony prepared by the Administrativ 
Law Judge. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE DECEDENT HAD NO PREEXISTING HEART CONDITION 
OR OTHER PREEXISTING CONDITIONS AND WAS ENTITLED 
TO USE THE "ANY EXERTION" STANDARD OF ALLEN 
TO ESTABLISH LEGAL CAUSATION 
As the Workers' Compensation Fund has pointed out/ the 
Administrative Law Judge in this matter found that the decedent/ 
Dale Steward/ had no "previously diagnosed heart condition". 
(R. 270) This finding is not controverted in any of the evidence 
before the Commission. The Fund refers to various "risk" factors 
but the fact remains that Mr. Steward had never previously been 
diagnosed as having heart problems and no medical examination 
before or after his death indicated the presence of preexisting 
heart disease. 
The Fund refers to a comment of Dr. M. Peter Heilbrun/ 
Mr. Steward's treating physician for a number of years for a 
prior industrial-related back injury/ wherein Dr. Heilbrun stated: 
"In retrospect/ it makes me wonder if some of his recent neck 
and shoulder pain was possibly myocardial in origin." (R. 135) 
Dr. Heilbrun's comment was made in a November 18/ 1985 
letter to Dr. Gerald Moress/ another of Mr. Steward's treating 
physicians/ and appears to have been simply a question. Other 
evidence from Dr. Heilbrun adequately supports the finding of 
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the Administrative Law Judge. In a letter dated July 25, 1986, 
Dr. Heilbrun explained as follows: 
Mr. Dale Steward was treated by me over several years, 
from the time of his industrial injury of August 1, 1975, to 
his death in 1985. 
I last saw Mr. Steward on July 29, 1985 at which time 
he was having further neck pain which suggested evidence 
of persistent degenerative osteoarthritis without evidence 
of sufficient root compression. In addition, he had evidence 
of left shoulder pain secondary to either bicipital tendonitis 
impingement syndrome of the humeral head or a small rotator 
cuff tear. He improved with local injection by Dr. Ronald 
Mann. 
It should be noted that, although Mr. Steward had evidence 
of musculo-skeletal disease, his apparent cause of death 
was a myocardial infarction while driving a truck. 
He had no prior history of cardiac disease, thus his death 
should be considered to be an industrial-related [sic] 
cardiac event. (R. 245) 
In addition to Dr. Heilbrun's statements, Dr. Moress had 
performed a physical examination of Mr. Steward on October 11, 
1985, at which time he noted as follows: 
From a health standpoint, he has been diagnosed as having 
emphysema. He continues to smoke two packs a day. 
On examination blood pressure is 120/80, no carotid bruits, 
normal fundiscopic, normal pharynx. (R. 133) 
At prior examinations on April 24, 1981, and September 27, 1980, 
Dr. Moress indicated on both occasions that Mr. Steward's blood 
pressure was 120/80 and noted no signs of heart trouble or heart 
disease. (R. 129, 131) 
The only medical evidence presented by the Fund was a 
letter from J. Joseph Perry, M.D., to Shaun Howell, attorney 
for the Fund. Dr. Perry's conclusion is as follows: 
In terms of medical probability it is most likely that 
[Dale Steward] experienced a fatal cardiac arrhythmia 
while driving, lost consciousness a few seconds later 
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thus losing control of the vehicle and having the accident 
as reported. It is possible that his dextroamphetamine 
was related to his death because it may worsen arrhythmias 
in suseptible [sic] individuals. (R. Ill) 
Dr. Perry made no other conclusion with regard to preexisting 
heart disease in Mr. Steward and there was thus no substantial 
medical evidence before the Administrative Law Judge to indicate 
that Mr. Steward had any heart condition. 
The standard of review by an appellate court of Industrial 
Commission orders has been well explained in several opinions 
of the Utah Supreme Court. In Kaiser Steel Corporation v. Monfredi, 
631 P.2d 288 (Utah 1981), the Utah Supreme Court, after reviewing 
a number of Utah cases, stated as follows: 
Under any of these standards—Kavalinakis, Kent, or Norris— 
it is apparent that this court's function in reviewing 
Commission findings of fact is a strictly limited one 
in which the question is not whether the Court agrees 
with the Commission's findings or whether they are 
supported by the preponderance of evidence. Instead, 
the reviewing court's inquiry is whether the Commission's 
findings are 'arbitrary or capricious,' or 'wholly 
without cause' or contrary to the 'one [inevitable] 
conclusion from the evidence' or without 'any substantial 
evidence' to support them. Only then should the 
Commission's findings be displaced. _Id. at 890. 
It is clear in this case that there was substantial evidence 
to support the Administrative Law Judge's finding that Mr. Steward 
had no preexisting heart disease. 
The Administrative Law Judge also found that one of the 
contributing factors to his stress was "the use of amphetamines, 
probably in greater amounts than usual because of the lack of 
adequate rest." (R. 270) The Judge's findings were based on 
references in the record to use of amphetamines by Mr. Steward. 
For example, his wife indicated during the November 5, 1986 
hearing that Mr. Steward had been taking 10 milligrams of 
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Dexedrine, and that the dosage had recently been increased to 
15 milligrams by Dr. Moress. (R. 38-40, 57) Mrs. Steward 
testified that he usually only took the medication while he was 
working: 
Q How often would he take that medication? 
A When he needed it. 
But he wouldn't take it at home. He'd only take it while 
he was working, so he could stay awake. (R. 40) 
• * * 
Q Did he have problems staying awake when he was home? 
A Yes, he did. 
Q What would he do? 
A Well, only once in a great while, if it really got 
bad, well, then he'd take one and that. But he wouldn't 
take it towards the evening, he'd take it towards morning 
because he'd want to spend time with us. (R. 41) 
Mrs. Steward referred to Mr. Steward's sleep condition as 
narcolepsy. (R. 38) In his initial reports with regard to Mr. 
Steward, Dr. Moress refers to possible narcolepsy. (R. 130, 131) 
Dr. Heilbrun refers on several occasions to Dr. Moress's treatment 
of Mr. Steward for narcolepsy. (R. 149, R. 255) Dr. Perry, 
however, felt that narcolepsy had not been securely diagnosed: 
Complicating the issue is the mention of narcolepsy in 
the medical record. The patient had a history of sudden 
sleep attacks while driving and had been treated by 
amphetamines by his physician for several years prior 
to his demise. I find no studies in the records to 
document narcolepsy, thus this diagnosis is not secure 
in this individual. (R. Ill) 
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The Administrative Law Judge made no finding that Mr. Steward 
suffered from narcolepsy or that narcolepsy was a preexisting 
medical condition. Although the Industrial Commission refers 
to narcolepsy in its Order Denying Motion for Review (R. 286)/ 
this reference does not amount to a finding. 
Pursuant to the findings of the Administrative Law Judge, 
therefore/ Mr. Steward was taking amphetamines at the time of 
his accident/ but the use of amphetamines was directly related 
to his employment and was necessary for him to remain awake and 
alert while driving. This use of prescribed medication does not 
constitute a preexisting condition as defined in Allen v. 
Industrial Commission/ 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). 
POINT II: EVEN IF A PREEXISTING CONDITION IS 
FOUND TO EXIST, DECEDENT STEWARD 
EXPERIENCED UNUSUAL EXERTION 
Pursuant to the factors set forth in Allen v. Industrial 
Commission/ supra/ since Mr. Steward did not bring to his work 
"a personal element of risk such as a preexisting condition"/ 
Id, at 25, any employment-related exertion is enough to establish 
legal causation. 
If th€*re is no personal causal contribution/ that is/ 
if there is no prior weakness or disease/ any exertion 
connected with the employment and causally connected 
with the [injury] as a matter of medical fact is 
adequate to satisfy the legal test of causation. I<5. at 
26/ citing Larson, Workman's Compensation, Sec. 38.83 (b), 
at 7-278. 
Even if it were determined that Mr. Steward had a preexisting 
condition/ the facts in this proceeding establish that Mr. Steward 
experienced "exertion greater than that undertaken in normal/ 
everyday life" / Allen, supra/ at 25, or "an unusual or extraordinary 
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exertion." _Id. at 26. The Administrative Law Judge heard 
undisputed testimony establishing that Mr. Steward had had little 
sleep for at least 26 hours prior to his death. Between 7:00 
and 9:00 P.M. on November 10, 1985, he learned that his truck 
would be delayed. (R. 27) From at least that time until his 
departure at 5:30 A.M. on November 11, he did not go to bed 
and called the dispatcher for his employer on several occasions 
through the night to determine if his truck had arrived. (R. 28-29) 
When he called Mrs. Steward at 6:20 P.M. on November 11 from 
Denver, he indicated he was very tired and that he would not be 
able to sleep before leaving to return to Salt Lake at 11:00 P.M. 
(R. 30-32) According to Mrs. Steward, Mr. Steward's truck had 
never been as late as it was on November 10-11 and he had never 
had such a short layover in Denver. (R. 33, 59-60) 
As indicated by uncontroverted testimony, Mr. Steward 
experienced unusual or extraordinary stress and fatigue prior 
to his death. The evidence provides a more than adequate basis 
for the Administrative Law Judge's finding that Mrs. Steward 
had established legal causation, even if the higher standard 
which comes into play when a preexisting condition exists is 
used. 
POINT III. THE COMMISSION PROPERLY DETERMINED 
THAT MEDICAL CAUSATION WAS ESTABLISHED 
The court in the Allen case, supra, summarized the 
claimant's responsibility as follows: 
Under the medical cause test, the claimant must show 
by evidence, opinion, or otherwise that the stress, 
strain, or exertion required by his or her occupation 
led to the resulting injury or disability. Id. at 27. 
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Mrs. Steward presented evidence establishing the extreme fatigue 
and stress under which her husband was functioning at the time 
of his death. It is significant that the Fund's physician/ 
Dr. Perry/ apparently was not presented with information about 
the stress and fatigue factors/ since nowhere in his letter does 
he mention Mr. Steward's schedule/ his lack of sleep/ or the 
effects on him of the adverse weather conditions he experienced 
while driving to Denver. (R. 110-111) 
In a letter dated November 28/ 1986/ Dr. Heilbrun stated 
he had reviewed the fatigue and stress factors and noted as 
follows: 
As I stated in my note of July 25/ 1986/ addressed 'To 
Whom It May Concern'/ I believe that/ with the stress 
surrounding the driving and delivery requirements of 
Mr. Steward's job/ I agree with t)r. Perry there is a 
reasonable medical probability that the patient suffered 
a fatal arrhythmia while driving and/ thus/ his death 
should be considered an industrial related [sic] 
cardiac event. (R. 255) 
Although the findings and order of the Administrative Law Judge 
do not refer to Dr. Heilbrun's letter/ counsel for Mrs. Steward 
received permission from the Judge to submit the letter (R. 92), 
and it was provided to opposing counsel and the Judge and made 
part of the record. (R. 254-256) 
In sum, Dr. Heilbrun reviewed the stress and fatigue 
factors not addressed by Dr. Perry and determined they were 
contributing factors to Mr. Steward's death. No evidence of 
any nature contradicting Dr. Heilbrun's conclusion has been 
presented by the Fund. 
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Apart from the November 28 letter from Dr. Heilbrun, the 
Administrative Law Judge took judicial notice of a chart 
reproduced in the Order Denying Motion for Review of the 
Industrial Commission. (R. 287-288) As noted by the Commission, 
the chart constituted "consensus medical opinion that stress/ 
fatigue and stimulants are all common precipitating causes of 
cardiac arrhythmias." (R. 287) The Fund makes much of the fact 
that the chart was not introduced during the hearing itself and 
asserts that the Fund was entitled to be afforded an opportunity 
to refute the judicially noted information. The Administrative 
Law Judge's consideration of the material/ however/ was entirely 
appropriate and is supported by the Utah Rules of Evidence/ 
case law/ and statutes. 
Rule 201 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides that a 
court may take judicial notice of adjudicative facts "capable of 
accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose 
accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." (Rule 201(b)(2) ) 
The court may take judicial notice upon its own initiative 
(Rule 201(c) ) and/ upon timely request/ a party is entitled to 
be heard concerning the "propriety of taking judicial notice 
and the tenor of the matter noticed. In the absence of prior 
notification/ the request may be made after judicial notice has 
been taken." (Rule 201(e) ) It is significant that judicial 
notice may be taken at any stage of a proceeding. (Rule 201(f) ) 
Although Rule 201 provides a mechanism for the Fund to be 
heard with regard to the Administrative Law Judge's taking of 
judicial notice/ the Fund made no request to be heard and should 
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not be allowed to complain at this stage of the proceedings that 
it could not object to the material. 
The Fund makes reference to a recent Colorado case, Prestige 
Homes, Inc. v. Legouffe, 658 P.2d 850 (Colo. 1983), wherein the 
Colorado Supreme Court held that the Colorado Court of Appeals 
improperly took judicial notice of certain medical treatises in 
overturning an Industrial Commission order. The court properly 
noted that judicial notice is cautiously used, Ld. at 853, but 
the facts in the present situation are distinguishable from 
those in the Legouffe case. First, the Court of Appeals in 
Legouffe took judicial notice of medical information to overrule 
the specific fact findings of the Industrial Commission's referee. 
The appellate court used certain medical treatises to discredit 
the considered opinion of an expert medical witness concerning 
medical effects of contact by the decedent with a 220 volt 
power line. j^ d. at 853-854. The Supreme Court in Legouffe was 
justifiably critical of the appellate court's attempt to place 
itself in the position of the finder of fact. 
By contrast, in the present case judicial notice was taken 
by the Administrative Law Judge of a table considered by the 
Commission to be "consensus medical opinion." (R. 287) The 
material is not in conflict with any of the medical opinions 
in the case and simply supplements evidence already before the 
court. Dr. Perry himself referred to certain factors which 
may cause a fatal cardiac arrhythmia, including drug use (R. Ill) 
and coronary artery disease. (R. 112) As noted previously, 
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Dr. Perry did not consider the stress and fatigue factors, but 
they were reviewed by Dr. Heilbrun who felt Mr. Steward probably 
suffered a fatal arrhythmia ij[ "the stress surrounding the 
driving and delivery requirements of Mr. Steward's job" was 
also considered. (R. 255-256) 
The Administrative Law Judge was not attempting to 
substitute his judgment for that of any of the doctors in the 
matter, but rather took judicial notice of an additional factor 
not referred to by Dr. Perry. As noted by the Judge: 
For the most part, the Administrative Law Judge adopts 
the foregoing opinions of Dr. Perry as his own findings 
of fact. However, the Administrative Law Judge finds 
that Dr. Perry's opinions do not appear to be based 
upon all of the facts as reflected by the record and for 
this reason the Administrative Law Judge differs from 
Dr. Perry with respect to the ultimate question of medical 
causation. (R. 272) 
The Administrative Law Judge then concluded that emotional 
stress and fatigue "may well have precipitated [Mr. Steward's] 
fatal cardiac arrhythmia." (R. 272) This conclusion is supported 
not only by the judicially noted chart, but by the opinion of 
Dr. Heilbrun. 
The Fund asserts that it would have refuted the evidence 
judicially noted by the Administrative Law Judge by pointing 
out that since Mr. Steward was taking prescription drugs, he 
was predisposed to suffering a fatal arrhythmia. (Appellants' 
Brief, p. 19) This position was already before the Administrative 
Law Judge, however, since Dr. Perry referred to the fact that 
dextroamphetamine could "worsen arrhythmias in susceptible individual 
(R. Ill) 
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The Utah Supreme Court has approved Industrial Commission 
use of judicial notice even when in direct conflict with testimony 
of a physician. In North Beck Mining Co. v. Industrial Commission 
of Utah/ 58 Utah 486, 200 P. Ill (1921), the Court stated as 
follows: 
Commenting upon the position taken by the Commission, 
counsel for plaintiffs say it is difficult to see how 
they arrive at a 50 per cent, loss of his hand on this 
basis, because the only evidence in the record shows that 
the loss should be 'around 30 or 40 per cent.1 That was 
the effect of the testimony of a physician at the hearing 
before the Commission. A majority of the Commission disregard 
the testimony of the physician, evidently believing that 
they knew as much as he about the degree of efficiency 
lost by the amputation of the fingers of a hand. 
* * * 
We are impressed, from what is common knowledge of which 
courts take judicial notice, that the appellant's loss 
of the usability of his hand in his vocation as a miner 
exceeds the 50 per cent, loss of efficiency found by the 
Commission, and that if the Commission made any mistake 
it Wcis not in finding the per centage of loss of claimant's 
right hand to be in excess of 50 per cent. IQ. at 492-494. 
In the present situation, as discussed above, the Administratis 
Law Judge took judicial notice of factors that had been already 
discussed by Dr. Heilbrun and Dr. Perry. The Judge did not 
use the judicially noticed material to refute any medical conclusion 
which dealt with all of the facts before him, but simply evaluated 
facts not addressed by Dr. Perry. 
In conclusion, it hardly requires noting that Section 
35-1-88, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, provides: 
Neither the commission nor its hearing examiner shall 
be bound by the usual common-law or statutory rules of 
evidence, or by any technical or formal rules of procedure. 
. . . The commission may make its investigation in such 
manner as in its judgment is best calculated to carry 
out justly the spirit of the Workmen's Compensation Act. 
The Workers' Compensation Fund cites cases which they contend 
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show the Administrative Law Judge's actions prejudiced them 
or deprived the Fund of its Constitutional right to an impartial 
hearing. The Fund's position is without basis, however, since 
the factors of stress, fatigue, and amphetamine use were presented 
and addressed at the hearing and in subsequent submissions by 
the parties and were considered by Drs. Heilbrun and Perry. 
The Judge took no short cuts and the Fund had an opportunity 
to address all factors considered by him. 
Even if this court disregarded Dr. Heilbrun's opinion 
and determined that the Administrative Law Judge improperly 
took judicial notice of the reference material, Mrs. Steward 
has provided sufficient evidence to establish medical causation. 
As noted in the Allen case, a claimant can establish medical 
causation in several ways, since "the stress, strain, or exertion 
required by his or her occupation" and leading to injury or 
death may be shown by "evidence, opinion, or otherwise. ..." 
Id. at 9. 
A Colorado Supreme Court decision, Industrial Commission 
v. Havens, 314 P.2d 698 (1957), deals with a fact situation 
similar to the present case and discusses how medical causation 
may be shown. In Havens, the court reversed a decision of the 
Industrial Commission denying compensation to an individual 
who was found dead in the cab of his truck ten minutes after 
leaving a restaurant where he had eaten lunch. The court noted 
that no medical examination of the body was performed and there 
was no autopsy. The coroner listed the cause of death as "coronary 
occlusion". Id. at 699-700. The decedent had been examined 
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by his company's doctor several days before his death and the 
doctor had noted no heart conditions or problems and stated 
that Mr. Haven's blood pressure was normal. _Id. at 700. 
Although neither the claimants nor the defendants presented 
any medical evidence linking the decedent's work activity to 
a coronary occlusion/ _Ic3. at 700/ the court held that medical 
causation had been established: 
[D]id the circumstantial evidence before the referee establish 
the causal connection between the occurrence and the death/ 
or must claimants prove it by expert medical testimony? 
The unrebutted evidence of the preceding events leads 
to the conclusion that the over-exertion and possibly 
the blow from the handcar were the cause of the coronary 
occlusion. This conclusion is not negatived by any evidence 
in the record/ and where as here a death occurs in the 
course of employment/ within a short time/ following a 
blow and overexertion as established by the evidence before 
the referee/ a presumption arises that the injury arose 
out of the employment. We hold that in such circumstances 
the claimants were not obliged to establish a causal connectior 
between the accident and resulting death by expert medical 
testimony. Ijd. at 701. 
As in the Havens case/ the facts relating to Mr. Steward's 
activities and schedule are undisputed. He was working under 
conditions of stress and extreme fatigue/ and was stricken while 
driving his company truck and while complying with the rigorous 
schedule imposed on him by his employer. Medical causation 
has been established by Mrs. Steward in this proceeding even 
if Dr. Heilbrun's opinion and the judicially noted material 
were not considered/ since no other causes for his death have 
been medically established. 
The Fund claims the Commission erred in not referring 
the matter to a medical panel. As stated in Section 35-1-77/ 
Utah Code Annotated 1953/ as amended/ "the Commission may refer 
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the medical aspects of the case to a medical panel. ..." (Emphasis 
added) Referral of matters to a medical panel is therefore 
discretionary. See Champion Home Builders v. Industrial Commission/ 
703 P.2d 306, 308 (Utah 1985). 
Appellants assert that the present situation is one "where 
the evidence of causal connection between the work-related event 
and the injury is uncertain or highly technical"/ Champion Home 
Builders/ supra/ at 308. The undisputed evidence in this matter/ 
however/ establishes the causal connection between Mr. Stewardfs 
stress and fatigue and his death. Contrary to Appellants' assertions 
the circumstances surrounding Mr. Steward's death were clearly 
established and were tied by competent medical authority to 
his death. 
POINT IV. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION MET ITS DUTY TO 
REVIEW THE ENTIRE RECORD 
The Workers' Compensation Fund asserts that the Industrial 
Commission erred by not reviewing the entire record in the matter 
as mandated by Section 35-1-82.54, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
as amended/ since the hearing was not transcribed until after 
the August 27/ 1987 Order Denying Motion for Review. Even if 
the Commission did not have access to the transcript/ which 
has not been established by the Fund/ the Commission had the 
benefit of the Administrative Law Judge's summary of testimony 
(R. 248-250)/ which accurately summarized the evidence presented 
at the hearing. The Commission adequately considered the entire 
record in this proceeding. 
CONCLUSION 
As found by the Administrative Law Judge and affirmed 
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by the Industrial Commission, Applicant Bernice Steward met 
her burden of establishing both legal and medical causation 
with respect to the work-related death of her husband on November 
12, 1985. The trier of fact had before him no evidence establishing 
that Mr. Steward had a preexisting heart condition. In addition, 
he made no finding that Mr. Stewardfs use of amphetamines constitute* 
a preexisting condition. There is no dispute that Mr. Steward 
was functioning under unusually stressful circumstances and 
was extremely fatigued. No medical evidence was provided by 
the Workers' Compensation Fund that considered the fatigue and 
stress elements or related them to Mr. Steward's death. Mrs. 
Steward, on the other hand, introduced the opinion of Dr. Heilbrun 
that her husband's death was medically linked to his employment-cause 
stress and fatigue. There is no basis in this proceeding to 
claim that the findings of the Administrative Law Judge, as 
affirmed by the Industrial Commission, were arbitrary or capricious 
or unsupported by any substantial evidence. The matter did 
not require submission to a medical panel and the ruling of 
the Industrial Commission should be affirmed. 
DATED this / *> day of February, 1988. 
DWIGHT L. KING & ASSOCIATES/ P.C. 
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APPENDIX 
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35-1-77. Medical panel — Discretionary authority of com-
mission to refer case — Findings and reports — 
Objections to report — Hearing — Expenses. 
Upon the filing of a ciaim for compensation for injury by accident, or for 
death, arising out of or in the course of employment, and where the employer 
or insurance carrier denies liability, the commission may refer the medical 
aspects of the case to a medical panel appointed by the commission and having 
the qualifications generally applicable to the medical panel set forth in sec-
tion 35-2-56. The medical panel shall then make such study, take such X-rays 
and perform such tests, including post-mortem examinations where autho-
rized by the commission, as it may determine and thereafter make a report in 
writing to the commission in a form prescribed by the commission, and also 
make such additional findings as the commission may require. The commis-
sion shall promptly distribute full copies of the report of the panel to the 
applicant, the employer and the insurance carrier by registered mail with 
return receipt requested. Within fifteen days after such report is deposited in 
the United States post office, the applicant, the employer or the insurance 
carrier may file with the commission objections in writing thereto. If no objec-
tions are so filed within such period, the report shall be deemed admitted in 
evidence and the commission may base its finding and decision on the report 
of the panel, but shall not be bound by such report if there is other substantial 
conflicting evidence in the case which supports a contrary finding by the 
commission. If objections to such report are filed the commission may set the 
case for hearing to determine the facts and issues involved, and at such hear-
ing any party so desiring may request the commission to have the chairman of 
the medical panel present at the hearing for examination and cross-examina-
tion. For good cause shown the commission may order other members of the 
panel, with or without the chairman, to be present at the hearing for exami-
nation and cross-examination. Upon such hearing the written report of the 
panel may be received as an exhibit but shall not be considered as evidence in 
the case except as far as it is sustained by the testimony admitted. The ex-
penses of such study and report by the medical panel and of their appearance 
before the commission shall be paid out of the fund provided for by section 
35-1-68. 
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WORKERS' COMPENSATION 35-1-82.55 
35-1-82.54. Review of cases and orders by commission — 
Procedure — Effect of award [Effective until 
January 1, 1988]. 
The commission, upon referral of a case to it by an administrative law 
judge, or upon a motion being filed with it to review its own order, or an 
administrative law judge's supplemental order, shall review the entire record 
made in said case, and, in its discretion, may hold further hearings and re-
ceive further evidence, and make findings of fact and enter its award thereon 
The award of the commission shall be final unless set aside by the Supreme 
Court as hereinafter provided 
Review of cases and orders by commission — Proce-
dure — Effect of award [Effective January 1, 
1988]. 
(1) When a case is referred to the commission by an administrative law 
judge, or when a motion is filed with the commission to review its own order 
or an administrative law judge's supplemental order, the commission shall 
review the entire record made in the case, may hold further hearings and 
receive further evidence, and shall make findings of fact and enter its award 
(2) The award of the commission is final unless set aside by the Court of 
Appeals 
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35-1-88- Boles of evidence and procedure before oonnnriisirm and hear-
iag examiner—Admissible evidence.—Neither the commission nor its hear-
ing examiner shall be bound by the usual common-law or statutory rules 
„f evidence, or by any technical or formal rule* of procedure, other than 
3s herein provided or as adopted by the commission pursuant to this act. 
The commission may make its investigation in such manner as in its judg-
ment is best calculated to ascertain the substantial rights of the parties 
and to carry out justly the spirit of the Workmen's Compensation Act. 
The commission may receive as evidence and use as proof of any fact 
in dispute all evidence deemed material and relevant including, but not 
limited to the following : 
(a) Depositions and sworn testimony presented in open hearings. 
(b) Reports of attending or examining physicians, or of pathologists. 
(c) Reports of investigators appointed by the commission. 
(d) Reports of employers, including copies of time sheets, book ac-
. uiiuts or other records. 
\t) Hospital records in the case of an injured or diseased employee. 
History: X*. 1917, ch. 1009 f SS; C L» 
1917. $5149; E. 8. 1933 4 C. 1*43, 40-142; 
L. 196&, c*. 67, § 1. 
Compiler's Hotes. 
The 1965 amendment rewrote this sec-
tion which read: "The commission shall 
sot be bound by the usual common law 
r statutory rules of evidence, or by any 
:»rhnieal or formal rules of procedure, 
VT'IT than as herein provided; but may 
au«ke its investigations in such manner as 
•n its judgment is best calculated to as-
-rtum the substantial rights of the par 
"•••s and to carry out justly the bpint of 
!hi^  title." 
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JUDICIAL NOTICE. 
Rule 201. Judicial notice of adjudicative facts. 
(a) Scope of rule. This rule governs only judicial notice of adjudicative 
facts. 
lb) Kinds of facts. A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to 
reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territo-
rial jurisdiction of the trial court or <2> capable of accurate and ready determi-
nation by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. 
(c) When discretionary. A court may take judicial notice, whether re-
quested or not. 
(d> When mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice if requested by a 
party and supplied with the necessary information. 
le) Opportunity to be heard. A party is entitled upon timely request to an 
opportunity to be heard as to the propriety of taking judicial notice and the 
tenor of the matter noticed. In the absence of prior notification, the request 
may be made after judicial notice has been taken. 
(fl Time of taking notice. Judicial notice may be taken at any stage of the 
proceeding. 
<gi Instructing jury. In a civil action or proceeding, the court shall in-
struct the jury to accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed. In a criminal 
case, the court shall instruct the jury that it may, but is not required to, accept 
as conclusive any fact judicially noticed. 
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is 
the federal rule, verbatim, and consolidates the 
law of judicial notice formerly contained in 
Rules 9 through 12, Utah Rules of Evidence 
(1971 • and in Utah Code Annotated. § 78-24-1 
[76-25-1] 1953) (superseded by this rule] into 
one broadly defined rule The Utah Supreme 
Court has stated the rule with reference to ju-
dicial notice in Little Cottonwood Water Co. v. 
Kimball. 76 Utah 243. 267. 289 Pac. 116 < 19301 
where the court stated: "In short, a court is 
presumed to know what every man of ordinary 
intelligence must know about such things." 
See also DeFusion Co. v. Utah Liquor Control 
ComnVn. 613 P.2d 1120 lUtah 1980). 
Subdivision (a) "governs only judicial notice 
of adjudicative facts," and does not deal with 
instances in which a court may notice legisla-
tive facts, which is left to the sound discretion 
of trial and appellate courts Compare Rule 12. 
Utah Rules of Evidence • 1971 > Since legisla-
tive facts are matters that go to the policy of a 
rule of law as distinct from the true facts that 
are used in the adjudication of a controversy 
they are not appropriate for a rule of evidence 
and best left to the law-making considerations 
by appellate and trial courts. 
Subdivision »b> is in accord with the Little 
Cottonwood Water Co. case, supra, and the 
substance of Rule 9<1> and <2). Utah Rules of 
Evidence 1971 >. Utah law presumes that the 
law o: another jurisdiction is the same as that 
of the State of Utah and judicial notice has 
been taken from the law of other states and 
foreign countries. Lamberth v Lamberth. 550 
P.2d 200 Utah 1976"; Maple v. Maple. 566 
P.2d 1229 Utah 1977- The Utah court has 
taken judicial notice under Rule 9<2). Utah 
Rule.- of Evidence < 1971 • of the rules and regu-
lation- of the Tax Commission. Nelson v. State 
Tax Corr.rr.n. 29 Utah 2d 162. 506 P.2d 437 
1197/ Tht broad language of subdivision -b -is 
idem.... ;. Rule 201 of the Uniform Rules ot 
Ewden^ 1974 • Judicial notice of foreign law 
is permissible under this rule. Provisions of 
this rule supersede Utah Code Annotated, Sec-
tion 78-25-1 < 1953' [superseded by this rule], 
since the statute is merely illustrative of items 
encompassed within the broad framework of 
this rule. The foreign law of some jurisdictions 
might best be left to proof through witnesses if 
the resort to sources available in the State of 
Utah is questionable 
Subdivision <c) is discretionary, but subdivi-
sion id) requires the court to take judicial no-
tice if requested by a party and if supplied with 
the necessary information to make a determi-
nation of whether to take judicial notice. Com-
pare Rules 9<2> and 10«3 . Utah Rules of Evi-
dence 11971». The committee believes that Rule 
201 d) simplifies the process of taking judicial 
notice of adjudicative facts by making it man-
datory when a party makes a request therefor 
and supplies the court with the necessary in-
formation. 
Subdivision >e» is similar to Rule 10<1>. «2'» 
and 3>. Utah Rules of Evidence '1971). 
Subdivision <g is in accord with Rule 11, 
Utah Rules of Evidence • 1971». The provision 
that in a criminal case the court shall instruct 
the jury that it may but is not required to ac-
cept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed 
has no counterpart in Utah Rules of Evidence 
(19711 Accord. State v. Lawrence. 120 Utah 
323. 234 P.2d 600 '1951 > See also. Amendment 
VI. Constitution of the United States. 
Cross-References. — Court to impart mat-
ters of judicial knowledge to jury. § 78-21-3. 
Jury bound to accept declaration of judicial 
knowledge. * 78-21-3. 
Municipalities, notice of existence and classi-
fication. * 10-2-306 
Ordinance or private statute, notice of, Rule 
9M.. UR.CP. 
Seal of industrial commission, notice of. 
$ 3V1-8 
Se.il of public servu't- commission, notice of. 
* 54-1-4. 
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iJOSFriiprpr.YM.r!,r.A.c.c. 
CARDIOLOGY 
COTTONWOOD MEDICAL TOWER 
5770 SOUTH 250 EAST, SUITE 340 
MURRAY, UTAH 84107 
Ju ly 29, 1986 
Shaun Howel1 
Attorney a t Law 
S t a t e Insurance Fund 
560 South 300 East 
P.O. Box 45420 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0420 
Dear Counselor: 
T have evaluated all of the information sent to me on this 
somewhat complicated case. 
It seems clear that Mr. Steward was not conscious when his 
rig swerved to the left and ran off coming to rest on top of the median wall 
without apparently overturning or coming to an abrupt stop as it would with 
a collision. Additionally on arrival in the Emergency Department there was 
no gross evidence of physical injury or trauma according to the emergency 
physician. Additionally, the photographs sent to me demonstrate very little 
trauma to the rig he was driving. Thus, I think trauma can be excluded 
with a reasonable degree of confidence in this case. 
Complicating the issue is the mention of narcolepsy in the 
medical record. The patient had given a history of sudden sleep attacks 
while driving and had been treated with amphetamines by his physician for 
several years prior to his demise. I find no studies in the record to 
document narcolepsy, thus this diagnosis is not secure in this individual. 
Of the two scenarios which may have occurred, that is falling 
asleep then suffering a cardiac arrest sometime after contacting tiie median 
wall, or having the cardiac arrest while driving, only the latter seems to 
have firm medical support. Had he suffered narcolepsy while driving he 
would have awakened when he left the road (T speak from experience) and 
there seemed to be no event which would have been of sufficient severity 
to cause his death. It is remotely possible that the shock and fear ot 
waking up in the middle of a serious accident would have been sufficient 
to engender the fatal cardiac arrhythmia, but this does not seem very 
probable. 
In terms of medical probability it is most likely that he ex-
perienced a fatal, cardiac arrhythmia while driving, lost consciousness a few 
seconds later thus losing control of the vehicle and having the accident as 
reported. It is possibLe that his dextroamphetamine was related to his death 
because it may worsen arrhythmias in susepfible individuals. 
RE: Dale W. Steward 
#86-05663 
Inj: 11-11-85 
TEtEPHONE (801) 266 3418 
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page 2 continued 
An autopsy would have been supporting this diagnosis, but likely 
would not have confirmed it with an absolute degree of certainty. I suspect it 
would have shown amphetamines present and coronary artery disease present. At 
this point in time exuming the body would not shed any light on the presence 
of amphetamine. It would, however, document the presence or absence of coronary 
artery disease. In the absence of drugs it is extremely unusual for cardiac 
arrest to occur in a person with normal coronary arteries. If the absence 
of coronary artery disease could be documented, then the scenario of striking 
the median wall, waking up and then suffering a fatal arrhythmia would become 
somewhat more plausible. Whether or not that has any legal significance is 
of course not within my area of expertise. 
In summary in terms of reasonable medical probability, the 
patient suffered a fatal arrhythmia while driving and the accident was simply 
the result of his Heath and subsequent loss of control of the vehicle. While 
other possibilities pxist, they are far less likely. To exume and perform 
a post-mortum examination of the body would alter those probabilities to an 
extent, hut it is highly unlikely it would provide definitive answer. 
T hone this has been helpful to you. 
Sincerely 
J. Joseph Pemry, M.D. 
JJP/jv 
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M. Peter Heilbrun. M.D. 
Ronald I. Apfelbaum, M.D. 
LaVerne S. Erickson, M.D. 
Marion L. Walker, M.D. 
THE ^ 
UNIVERSITY 
OFUTAH 
July 25, 1986 
Mrs. Bernice Steward 
1410 West Sixth South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84104 
Dear Mrs. Steward: 
I am enclosing the following letter. Please read through it and advise me 
if you feel it satisfactorily explains my thoughts on the industrially 
related nature of Dale's heart attack. 
Regards, 
4 ^ £sd^ MA 
M. Peter Heilbrun, M.D. 
MPH/tw 
Enclosure 
(Tr:7/31/86) Dictated by the doctor; 
signed in his absence. 
EXHIBIT NO. 
Division of Neurological Surger\ 
>Lhn.,| 
N u t 1 • 
f Meduine 
r
'\i Mt'dnnl Drive 
r Clt\ I't.lh M l }2 
Ml) SM-b'MlS 
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M. Peter Heilbrun. M.D. 
Ronald 1. Apfelbaum. M.D. 
LaVerne S. Erickson. M.D. 
Marion L. Walker. M.D. 
July 25, 1986 
T THE ^ 
UNIVERSITY 
OF UTAH 
To Whom It May Concern: 
Re: Dale Steward 
Mr. Dale Steward was treated by me over several years, from the time of his 
industrial injury of August 1, 1975, to his death in 1985. 
I last saw Mr. Steward on July 29, 1985, at which time he was having 
further neck pain which suggested evidence of persistent degenerative 
osteoarthritis without evidence of significant root compression. In 
addition, he had evidence of left shoulder pain secondary to either 
bicipital tendonitis impingement syndrome of the humeral head or a small 
rotator cuff tear. He improved with local injection by Dr. Ronald Mann. 
It should be noted that, although Mr. Steward had evidence of musculo-
skeletal disease, his apparent cause of death was a myocardial infarction 
while driving a truck. 
He had no prior history of cardiac disease, thus his death should be con-
sidered to be an industrial-related cardiac event. 
Regards, 
M. Peter Heilbrun, M.D. 
Professor and Head 
Division of Neurosurgery 
MPH/ tw
 Dictated by the doctor; 
(Tr:7/31/86) signed in his absence. 
'H:3IT NO. A'6 
D m s i o n of Neurological Surger> 
>< hoo! of \ lcdk no 
M) \«>rh \!<>di<a! f)r \<-
Mlt i ak- Cil\ I Mb M l L> 
( S H I I ">> l - t ) ( l t>S 
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M. Peter Heilbrun, VI.D. 
Ronald I. \pfelbaum. M.I) 
LaVerne S. Erickson. M.I) 
Marion L. Walker. M.D. 
November 28, 1986 
Mr. Thomas R. King 
Suite 205, Sentinel Building 
2121 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Dear Mr. King: 
Thank you for your letter dated October 30, regarding the description of 
events leading to possible fatigue and stress surrounding Mr. Steward's 
untimely death on November 12 or 13, 1985. 
In addition to your letter, I reviewed the letter of Dr. J. Joseph Perry. 
I agree with Dr. Perry that there was medical probability that Mr. Steward 
suffered a fatal arrhythmia while driving, resulting in his loss of control 
of the vehicle and the subsequent accident. 
The issue of narcolepsy as a contributing factor is a possibility. I 
believe a review of the records of Dr. Gerald Moress would show that, in 
fact, he had been diagnosed as having narcolepsy and was actively being 
treated with amphetamine medications. 
I would also state that I knew Mr. Steward as a patient for many years 
dating back to his industrial injury of August 1, 1975, and although he had 
multiple medical problems, he always managed to return to the work place 
and perform extremely well. 
As I stated in my note of July 25, 1986, addressed "To Whom It May 
Concern", I believe that, with the stress surrounding the driving and 
delivery requirements of Mr. Steward's job, I agree with Dr. Perry that 
there is reasonable medical probability that the patient suffered a fatal 
arrhythmia while driving and, thus, his death should be considered an 
industrial related cardiac event. I do not feel there would be any benefit 
in performing a postmortem examination of his body. His death occurred 
while he was working and performing the required conditions of his employ-
ment. Because the medical examiner in Colorado did not perform an autopsy 
at the time of death, it should not be a factor in the denial of benefits 
to his widow by the Utah State Industrial Commission. 
Dnision of Nt'iir nlo^H .it *Minf<T\\ 
N l l . i , ' V . , 
- 3 3 -
THE ^ 
UNIVERSITY 
OF UTAH 
Thomas R. King 
November 28, 1986 
Page Two 
I hope this information is helpful. 
Regards, 
M. Peter Heilbrun, M.D. 
MPH/dr 
(Tr:12/8/86) 
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